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Throughout the 20th century, economists have generally acknowledged the importance of the central bank 
discount rate as the reference interest rate in a country: by increasing the interest rate during economic 
booms that forego the busts, the Central Banks help alleviate the consequences of the crises, by deterring 
entrepreneurship and speculative pressures. Similarly, the discount rate is decreased during recessions, 
when  Central  Banks  need  to  stimulate  economic  activity  by  providing  cheap  money  and  restore  the 
optimistic spirit among entrepreneurs.   
This study aims to correlate the macroeconomic evolutions in the 20th century Romanian economy with the 
variations in the discount rate of the National Bank. It is also meant to reveal to what extent – if any – 
these evolutions have been influenced by the discount rate policy. By analyzing the discount rate changes 
during the first half of the 20th century, we can easily notice rather abrupt changes – of about 1-1.5%, 
both upwards and downwards – in the discount rate. Nowadays, such changes are no longer possible, due 
to the intricacies and complexity of the economic, financial and banking inter-relations at the European 
and global level.  
The discount rate evolution points out that the Central Bank has provided the cheapest capital throughout 
the 20th century, at an average rate of 5-6%. The evolution also reveals that the discount rate has been the 
cause – and not the consequence – of economic policies   
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Both policy researchers and public authorities are rather divided and subjective when it comes to 
explaining or grounding various aspects of economic policy. In this respect, the discount rate is 
one of the most illustrative examples, in that the discount rate policy is subject to fierce debates 
and controversies. A thorough attempt to research into or to establish correlations regarding the 
central bank’s discount rate will most certainly reveal some very interesting observations
58. 
This paper is meant to establish a possible correlation between the macroeconomic evolutions in 
the 20
th century Romanian economy and the variations in the official discount rate of the National 
Bank (the interest rate used to lend money to commercial banks for re-financing). It is also meant 
to reveal to what extent – if any – these evolutions have been influenced by the discount rate 
policy of the monetary authorities. 
Throughout the 20
th century, economists have unanimously acknowledged the importance of the 
discount rate as the primary interest rate within a state or group of states: by means of increasing 
the interest rate during economic booms that forego the busts, the Central Banks help alleviate 
the  consequences  of  the  crises,  thus  deterring  entrepreneurship  and  speculative  pressures. 
Similarly,  the  discount  rate  is  decreased  during  recessions,  when  Central  Banks  need  to 
encourage economic activity by providing cheap money and restore the optimistic spirit among 
entrepreneurs.   
By analyzing the discount rate changes during the first half of the 20
th century, we can easily 
notice rather abrupt variations – of about 1-1.5%, both upwards and downwards – in the discount 
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rate; this reflects rather large changes in the most important economic and banking indicator. At 
that point, such fluctuations were afforded by the national, European and international economic 
situation, whereas nowadays, such changes are no longer possible, due to the intricacies and 
complexity of the economic, financial and banking inter-relations at the European and global 
level. The evolution of the official discount rate points out a sensible conclusion: the Central 
Bank  has  provided  the  cheapest  capital  throughout  the  20
th  century,  at  a  discount  rate  that 
fluctuated on average between 5-6%. The evolution also reveals that throughout the 20
th century, 
the discount rate has been the cause – and not the consequence – of economic policies. All these 
aspects are illustrative of the decisive influence that the official discount rate has on the economic 
developments in Romania. 
Before  starting  an  in-depth  analysis  of  the  discount  rate  mechanism,  we  must  mention  two 
general aspects related to the concept: 
  -The specificity of the concept and its close connection to the banking   environment 
have rendered it less known and rather neglected in the general   economic environment; a lot of 
economists and, at the same time very few bankers   have  noticed  and  agreed  that  the 
different discount rates can be accounted for by  the degree of development and the size of the 
normal official discount rate 
  -The  utter  simplicity  of  the  influence  –  usually  a  negative  correlation  –  of  the 
  discount rate on economic growth; (here we must note the difficulty of   establishing 
precise mathematical correlations between the two indicators – the   discount  rate  and  the 
economic growth rate – due to the lack of statistical data on   economic  growth  during  the 
first half of the 20
th century). In this respect, as early   as 1915, M. Musceleanu first noted that: 
“There exists an inverse relationship   between  this  degree  of  development  (economic  and 
financial – n.n.) and the level   of the official discount rate: the more prosperous the economic 
situation, the lower   the official discount rate” 
The current conception on the discount rate policy is rooted in the “debates and inquiries that 
took  place  during  the  suspension  of  the  GB  pound  convertibility  (1797-1821),  when  many 
economists and bankers realized that a rise in the official discount rate above the market discount 
rate was susceptible of hindering credit expansion and of triggering deflation, together with its 
consequences: a decrease in prices and an improvement in the terms of exchange. The immediate 
conclusion: the consequences are of an economic nature. “Even during the subsequent crises of 
1836, 1839, 1847, the Bank of England is believed not to have understood the utility of firmly 
handling the discount rate policy, because the timid attempts to lift the discount rate could not put 
an end to the depression”
59. 
Throughout the 20
th century, economists have generally acknowledged the importance of the 
central bank discount rate as the reference interest rate in a country: “By increasing the interest 
rate  during  vigorous  economic  booms  that  precede  an  imminent  bust,  the  Central  Banks 
contribute  to  alleviating  the  consequences  of  the  crises,  by  deterring  entrepreneurship  and 
speculative pressures, in a time that the economic state requires cautiousness. By increasing the 
reference rate, deflation occurs. Finally, the discount rate is decreased when its purpose has been 
achieved or when, during recessions, the Central Bank needs to stimulate economic activity by 
providing cheap money and thus restore the optimistic spirit among entrepreneurs”
60.  
During recent years, the discount rate policy led by the main central banks has been much more 
effective than 100 years ago.  
The main characteristics of the discount rate are: 
  a. Its power is relative and it varies from country to country, and across time. 
  b. The low level of the reference rate lies at the bottom of the economic, banking  and 
political edifice  
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  c. Sometimes an increase in the reference rate is not sufficient to compensate the  risk 
incurred by the economic uncertainty 
  d. A decrease in the reference rate triggers an “extraordinary credit expansion”,   which, 
for the most part, generates economic depression, and not economic growth 
  e. A stabilization of the reference rate is possible, but not in the presence of strong 
  opportunistic movements or on a developing capital market 
  f.  The  diversity  of  economic  life  has  lead  to  rigid  principles  in  what  regards  the 
  reference rate 
What  actually  happens  in  the  economy  is  a  rather  simplistic  mechanism,  if  understood  by 
economic  and  banking  authorities:  if  the  reference  rate  is  increased,  interest  rates  will  also 
increase, production costs go up, which in turn, leads to a decrease in profits and investments. 
“On the contrary, if the official discount rate decreases, there will be a transfer of funds from the 
monetary to the capital market, where the interest rate is higher, but only for a limited period of 
time. Production remains constant, profits increase, and the fraction of benefits which is saved 
will serve either for self-financing, either for a long-term investment, encouraged by the new 
ascending business cycle… Considered as a means of market regularization, the discount rate 
policy needs changing and re-orienting from time to time, both in principle and in practice, as the 
modern  economic  and  financial  situations  require.  It  represents  though,  a  classical  way  of 
guidance for the national currency, perhaps the only one to have proven its capacity so far, but 
the  only  one  that  the  current  supporters  of  the  ``controlled  currency``  do  not  seem  to 
understand”
61. 
 
The principles of the discount rate 
  -The official discount rate of the central bank must be lower than the market rate  
  -If the production costs do not rise, the discount rate must be left unchanged 
  -If the production costs rise, the discount rate must also be increased in order to   prevent 
speculative pressure 
  -Every  ascending  movement  in  prices  cannot  be  encumbered  by  an  increase  in  the 
  discount rate 
  -Accidental events, such as wars, crises, reforms, revolutions etc “can provoke a  rapid 
increase in the discount rate in some countries, which can be conveyed to   other countries” 
(Stoenescu 1935) 
 
At the beginning of last century, H. Hornbostel noted that the repercussions of the discount rate 
fluctuations have become much more complex and that the application of the classical methods 
has disappointed frequently those who believed more in their efficiency. 
The official discount rate is usually motivated by general economic and financial interests, by the 
monetary circulation and credit expansion requirements. There is no standard formula for an 
infallible  discount  rate.  It  is  unanimously  accepted  that  economic  stability  with  no  inflation 
generates ever lower discount rates.  
All throughout the 20
th century, the discount rate levels – denominated “reference rate” as of 1
st 
January 2002 by the National Bank of Romania – have been as follows: 
  -The  period  (1891)  –  1901  –  1918  of  the  gold  standard:  this  period  has  generally 
  experienced  higher  discount  rates  of  6-7%  (during  the  agricultural  crisis  of  1894); 
  8%  in  1907;  6%  between  1914-1918;  this  points  out  that  periods  of  economic 
  upheaval usually generated higher discount rates than periods of normal activity.  In  this 
respect, dr.Radu Stoenescu (1935) observes that ”Between 1901-1914, the   National  Bank 
continued to help economic development through ever larger   productive  investments…  The 
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official discount rate was reduced to 8,7,6 and even   5% (14
th August 1902), as the economic 
situation improved and remained at this  level up to 1907 when, due to the international monetary 
crisis and the national   social-agricultural  crisis,  the  rate  had  to  be  raised  to  8%  again  (27
th 
October 1907).  When the crisis ended, the discount rate turned back to its previous 5% level 
(28
th   February 1908), a level maintained until 19
th October 1912, when it was again   lifted to 
6%. It was during 1912 that the age of prosperity and economic progress  came  to  an  end  and 
gave way to an endless period of economic and political crises,   which still goes on today… In 
1914, the National Bank considerably enhanced its   discount  operations,  in  order  to  help 
eliminate the previous crises. The variations   in the discount rate fluctuated between 5.5 – 7% 
… and the stagnation of the   economic activity determined a sensible decrease in the National 
Bank operations 
  -The period 1919 – 1928: the average level of the discount rate was 6%: an official 
  discount rate as low and  stable as possible, in order to help reconstruct the national 
  economy,  by  providing  a  cheap  commercial  credit…  Maintaining  too  low  a 
  discount rate seems to have fuelled the speculative activity which was going on.   Indeed, 
it was a most profitable business for large banks to borrow money by   refinancing  at  the 
National Bank at a 6% discount rate, and then lend it to smaller   banks or to other private entities 
at 20-25% interest rate. Not only did this hamper   economic  development,  but  it  also 
contributed to an aggravation of the national   currency  depreciation,  by  encouraging  the 
ascending tendency of prices 
  -The  period  1929-1934,  of  the  economic  crisis:  the  discount  rate  varied  between  8-
  9.5%; the 7% discount rate, although well grounded in the monetary situation,   seemed 
too high from an economic point of view, if we take into account the low   profitability  of 
enterprises and the conventional interest rate established by law in   March  1931  –  at  5 
percentage points above the official discount rate. Therefore,   the National Bank turned back 
to the 6% interest rate on April 5
th 1933… On   December  14
th  1934,  the  National  Bank 
proceeded to a new decrease in the official   rate, from 6% to a mere 4.5%... In this way the 
National Bank proved once again   not  only  a  considerable  comprehension,  but  also  its 
effective support, as the   issuing entity, to the development of our national economy 
  -The  period  1935-1946,  the  discount  rate  varied  between  3-4%.  This  interval 
  comprises  both  the  pre-war  period  and  World  War  II,  with  its  economic  and 
  financial peculiarities 
  -The  period  1947-1989  (the  communist  period)  –  during  this  age,  the  official 
  discount  rate  varied  by  1-2%  from  year  to  year  up  to  1955-1960;  then  as  the 
  centralized  plans  pinned  down  most  economic  evolutions  and  variables,  the  NBR 
  official discount rate leveled off at 1%. 
By analyzing the discount rate changes during the first half of the 20
th century, we can easily 
notice rather abrupt variations – of about 1-1.5%, both upwards and downwards – in the discount 
rate; this reflects rather large changes in the most important economic and banking indicator. At 
that point, such fluctuations were afforded by the national, European and international economic 
situation, whereas nowadays, such changes are no longer possible, due to the intricacies and 
complexity of the economic, financial and banking inter-relations at the European and global 
level. The evolution of the official discount rate points out a sensible conclusion: the Central 
Bank  has  provided  the  cheapest  capital  throughout  the  20
th  century,  at  a  discount  rate  that 
fluctuated on average between 5-6%. The evolution also reveals that throughout the 20
th century, 
the discount rate has been the cause – and not the consequence – of economic policies. All these 
aspects are illustrative of the decisive influence that the official discount rate has on the economic 
developments in Romania. 
 
THE NATIONAL BANK OF ROMANIA – PRESS RELEASE – January, 30
th 2002 
- The National Bank is Going to Replace the Official Discount Rate with the Reference Rate – 184 
The macroeconomic context in Romania during recent years has been characterized by structural 
liquidity surplus in the banking system, triggered mainly by the relative acceleration of capital 
inflows. The commercial banks enjoyed alternate financing sources, which led to a progressive 
reduction in re-financing operations, and forced the National Bank to sterilize the economy in 
order to prevent the inflationary pressures of the excess liquidity. Romania’s case is not unique, 
in fact sterilization operations are a common feature for most Central and Eastern European 
countries acceding to the EU.  
Since operations such as refinancing and discounting have gradually lost their relevance, in that 
they are not a particular feature of the current monetary policy orientation, the replacement of the 
discount rate with a rate of reference for the central bank operations seems like the natural thing, 
deriving  from  the  evolution  of  monetary  circumstances.  The  necessity  for  such  a  change  is 
reassured by the fact that, for at least the next three years, the sterilization shall continue to play a 
predominant  role  among  NBR  operations,  which  is  also  reflected  in  the  National  Economic 
Development Strategy for the Medium Term, conceived in March 2000 and submitted to the 
European Commission.  
A restoration of the discount rate is rather unlikely since, in light of the European accession 
process, the National Bank of Romania seeks to align its procedures to those of the European 
Central Bank, whose analytical kit – as that of many modern central banks – does not include the 
discount rate concept. 
In  this  context,  the  discount  rate  will  be  replaced  with  the  NBR  reference  rate  and  will  be 
calculated as to reflect the prevalent conditions on the monetary market. For the forthcoming 
period, the new interest rate will be calculated as an arithmetic average weighted with the level of 
transactions, of the interest rates for deposits and reverse repo operations of the previous month. 
The reference interest rate will be made public through press releases of the National Bank on the 
first working day on a monthly basis. This information will also be published in the monthly 
bulletins of the central bank as well as on its website (www.bnro.ro). 
The reference rate will enter into force on February 1
st 2002, by regulation of the National Bank 
of Romania which will repeal NBR Regulation no.11/1998 and will establish the level of the 
reference rate for February 2002.  
We must observe that the shift from the discount rate to the reference rate will not produce any 
shocks, the two indicators having comparable levels at present. 
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